Showing posts with label Google. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Google. Show all posts

January 21, 2010

Global online streaming of live IPL cricket matches on YouTube

As I discussed earlier, users prefer to watch live sports on television. They go to alternate digital platforms (Web or mobile) if they don't have access to a television, or the telecast is not available in their region, or if they want to simultaneously complement their TV experience. Sports leagues/rights owners/broadcasters also prefer television for distribution because it drives almost all of the distribution economics.

Having said that, yesterday's announcement that YouTube is partnering with the Indian Premier League (IPL), the richest cricket tournament in the world, to provide live global Webcast of all IPL matches is significant.

The partnership will allow the young IPL, which starts its third annual season on March 12th, to market its increasingly popular and novel format to a global audience. In addition, it will be a boon for global cricket fans living in countries where cricket is a niche sport and hence not available on television.

Google, which owns YouTube, gets exclusive global online rights for two years. All 60 matches in the tournament will be available for online streaming, which apparently will be free for consumers. Google will monetize the content through advertising and sponsorships, and split the revenue with IPL. The U.S. market, which has a decent size international fan base even though cricket is a niche sport here, will have re-broadcast rights. DirecTV offered the 2009 IPL season package to consumers in the U.S. last year on a pay-per-view basis for $99.

This is a great win for Google, which is playing nice with premium content owners in international markets, having learned from its mistakes in the U.S. where it started on the wrong path with content owners, and until today is fighting to counter their skepticism in its efforts to secure distribution rights for premium content. IPL content is by far the biggest prize with the maximum online commercial potential in the cricket-crazy Indian sub-continent.

The Google/IPL deal follows a similar partnership struck last year between NBC Universal and Ten Sports, one of the most popular sports cable channel in the Indian sub-continent and Middle East. The partnership provided NBCU exclusive digital rights to monetize Ten Sports content on a revenue-share basis. Full disclosure: I led the formation of the Ten Sports venture and managed the business at NBCU.

As part of that partnership, we launched tensports.com as the first, free, premier sports video portal in the Indian sub-continent and Middle East. The portal was designed to stream live cricket matches in full with a highly social and interactive experience. The first major live event on the portal - the Compaq Cup Tri-Series cricket tournament between India, New Zealand and Sri Lanka - beat all expectations by arguably hosting the biggest live event ever held in that market. During the four days of cricket streamed from the week-long tournament, over one million users watched live cricket online, with an average session time of 63 minutes. More than 100,000 concurrent users were clocked on the portal during the event. U.S., a much larger Internet market in comparison, crossed the 100,000 concurrent users mark for a live online event as recently as in 2005 during the global Live Aid music concerts that were streamed by AOL when I worked there.

Our decision on the business model - ad-supported, free live streaming to consumers - also proved to be a success. The Compaq Cup was sold out with premium brand advertisers like Cisco, Samsung, Airtel (the largest mobile carrier in India), Maruti (India's largest auto maker), Xerox, and we witnessed record audience engagement (upto 10x of average CTR) .

I'm not sure how big a catalyst was the NBCU/Ten Sports success in paving the way for the IPL/Google deal, but we definitely proved the model for live online sport streaming in the Indian sub-continent - a nascent but high-potential market that is showing impressive growth.

April 18, 2009

Electronic book readers will revolutionize book reading & writing

Electronic book readers are finally reaching the critical threshold limit beyond which adoption can easily tip over for the product to become a mass phenomenon. What may really hasten the tipping point is price reduction - $300+ for just a stand alone digital book reader feels too high to me. Amazon Kindle and Sony Reader Digital Book are the two top selling pure e-book readers, in addition to several mobile phone applications that try to serve the same function on the mobile device.

Of the two, Kindle has clearly captured the imagination of early adopters (me included), given its seamless end-to-end ecosystem - a smart device plus the largest selection of current books for the device plus free wireless delivery of reading material through Sprint's wireless network in the U.S.

Amazon sold 500,000 Kindles in 2008, per Mark Mahaney, the Internet analyst at Citigroup Investment Research. The number would have been higher had Amazon not run out of the product in November, just before the start of the peak Christmas buying season. Mahaney estimates Amazon will sell 1M Kindles this year, and 3.5M in 2010. These are clearly impressive numbers for a new product.

Below are couple of "aha" moments from my experience with Kindle that makes me believe that e-book readers will fundamentally revolutionize how we read books.

Recently I was out on a beach in the Caribbean (Puerto Rico), enjoying the Sunday New York Times on my Kindle. The guy next to me, an economist, who also happened to be from New York, started chatting about the state of the world economy, and shared a few points from the book that he was reading, The End of Poverty, by the celebrated economist Jeffrey Sachs. Intrigued by Sachs' plan in his book on how to eliminate extreme poverty around the world by 2025, I tapped a few strokes on my Kindle and found that the Kindle version of this New York Times bestseller was available on Amazon. I ordered the book, and jumped out of my beach lounger to take a quick dip in the warm Atlantic water. By the time I was back, voila...there it was - the complete ~400-page long book was downloaded and available for me to enjoy.

It felt amazingly liberating. The whole world of books was at my fingertips, anytime, anywhere. (Kindle wireless service through Sprint 3G high-speed data network is currently only available in the U.S. and its territories like Puerto Rico).

Another such liberating moment came couple of months back. I was flying out of New York to speak at the FRAMES media conference in Mumbai, India. Just as I made myself comfortable on the flight seat, I realized that I forgot to bring the book, The Brief Wondrous Life of Oscar Wao by Junot Diaz, that a friend had lend me to read on the long fifteen-hour flight. I pulled out my Kindle, ordered the book on Amazon, and was half way through the introduction before flight doors were closed for the take-off.

These "aha" moments mainly reflected the fact that the whole book store was following me wherever I went. But the revolutionary aspect of e-book reader also includes leveraging three main fundamental aspects of the Internet medium - social, non-linear and interactive - to the centuries-old, un-changed, practice of book reading and writing, in addition to its ability to transform the economics of book/print business.

Digitization of books and availability of that content on the Internet will enable fundamentally new experiences. People today read books mostly in a linear and immersive manner. That will change in a connected, digital world where information and content on the Internet is organized and navigated through hyperlinks. Readers will be able to jump straight to the section, page or paragraph they're interested in inside the book. Such behavior changes will be especially relevant for non-fiction work, where plot and story-telling is less important, and linear reading consumption can be broken down. Internet search engines, which rank Web pages based on their popularity, will bubble popular sections inside books to the top of Web search results. Imagine cataloging together all digital books on a certain topic you want to research, and reviewing only the most cited sections, ranked by a search engine that lists them based on relevancy level of what you're researching and its popularity amongst the masses.

Book reading could also become social, where you'll be able to annotate purchased material, which, if you choose, could be shared with others who purchase the same material, in real-time.

Browse, discovery and consumption of book content will therefore follow the patterns users have already been using with other content on the Internet for a long time.

In addition to how books are read, book writing will also fundamentally change. Authors can include incoming and outgoing hyperlinks. Footnotes, citations and bibliographies are obvious areas to leverage links. Similar to how Search Engine Optimization (SEO) is a must-do for every Website publisher today, book authors will write to optimize how search engines crawl inside their books and improve ranking of not just the book, but individual sections and pages inside the book to the top of user search results.

Google Book Search initiative is a key component to enable the above experiences. Google recently settled with book publishers and authors in a landmark $125M lawsuit, the biggest book deal ever, thus allowing Google to continue digital scanning of copyrighted books, an initiative Google had earlier started without their permission. It already has scanned over 10M books, and continues to scan several thousand more each month, including some which are out of circulation and cannot be found in book stores.

E-book readers may also significantly transform the economics of books/print business, and push for new business models. Steve Balmer, the CEO of Microsoft, believes that in five to ten years, physical delivery of all media will disappear in the U.S.

Google's legal settlement lays out a new system that will track total revenue generated by Google from books (book sales, advertising and other fees) and split it between Google (37%) and authors & publishers (63%).

Easy availability of digital books will boost sales. Impulse purchases, as I did with The End of Poverty on the beach, will be possible, and should further increase sales. According to Amazon, purchasing behaviors already show that Kindle owners buy more books on Amazon than non-Kindle owners. I've certainly bought more books in the past six months since buying Kindle than I would have otherwise. Not that the amount of free time I now have to read books has changed, but my reading behavior has. I've all my books in one light-weight device which I can easily carry everywhere, so I'm often "snacking" different books simultaneously, and more frequently jumping from one to another depending on my mood.

In terms of new business models, a-la-carte pricing, allowing readers to purchase only certain sections of a book/newspaper/magazine will become feasible. I may want to subscribe to only the Arts section of The New York Times on Sundays, as opposed to the whole newspaper, seven days a week, or just the Special Report section of Economist, whenever this section, which is not a regular piece, is carried in this weekly magazine.

As mentioned before, e-book readers, currently priced at $300+, are too expensive for a dedicated reading device. For Kindle, in addition to revenue from the device, Amazon has the potential to make money on purchased books as well. Amazon may want to therefore consider subsidizing the device to drive adoption, and recover the subsidy by requiring customers to purchase content worth a certain amount over a specified period of time - essentially following the model used by wireless carriers where new mobile phones are sold at substantially reduced price in return for a contract that allows carriers to recover the subsidy through monthly usage fees from the customer over the contract life.

Some however estimate that Amazon is currently loosing money on every book it sells on Kindle - it's subsidizing the book prize to promote the device. It may therefore be unlikely that Amazon will take a further hit and reduce the device price.

The fight between Amazon (content distributor) and authors/publishers (content owner) over who controls the content prize is already brewing up for books, as it did earlier with video on iTunes.

E-book readers eliminate printing and distribution cost of physical books, that can be up to 40% of the total cost of a book. Some of that cost savings can be transferred to customers. Already, the Kindle versions of The New York Times best-sellers cost $9.99 (incur no printing & distribution cost). In comparison, hard copy of the same book may cost $17 on the Amazon online book store (incur no distribution cost), and up to $28 at the Barnes & Noble bricks-and-mortar store (incur both printing & distribution cost).

Additionally, and increasingly important, is the "green" nature of electronic books, magazines & newspapers. It'd be interesting to calculate the total carbon foot-print of printing all of the reading material our planet consumes every year, and estimate reduction is green-house emissions if, say, 5% of the total reading consumption on the Earth goes purely digital.

Lastly, the subscription model for print, already hailed as the potential savior of last resort for newspapers, can get a significant boost by e-book readers. Kindle already sells hundreds of newspapers, magazines, blogs, etc., on a subscription basis. Yes, some of that content is otherwise freely available on the Internet. But similar to the role that the iTunes/iPod ecosystem has played with digital music, Amazon's seamless experience with its bookstore, one-click payment leveraging existing credit card information of millions of customers from the largest e-commerce store on the planet, and the impressive Kindle device can easily popularize a micro-transaction payment model for books, magazines & newspapers. It may very well provide a new lease of life to content providers which are otherwise struggling to derive full monetization potential of their content in the digital age.

January 24, 2009

The biggest book deal ever has lessons for content owners in today's digital age

Content owners have struggled to balance copyright laws and new technology as digitally savvy users maintain constant pressure on them to keep up with users' evolving behaviors. Music labels missed the digital revolution and then sued the fans who resorted to illegal downloads of songs. Movie and television studios and book publishers doubled up their ranks of lawyers and lobbyists instead of pro-actively experimenting with new technology to stay ahead of or at least keep up with their users' demand of providing new-technology-enabled, more convenient, content consumption experiences.

Content owners may however be finally learning their lesson - that it is better to redefine legal concepts and create innovative business models in order to help their customers than trying to stop the march of technology.

YouTube, the world's largest online video site, which is still fighting Viacom's $1B+ lawsuit over copyrighted infringement, recently announced a slate of deals with premium content owners. MGM, the financially struggling veteran Hollywood studio, will stream full-length movies and television shows on YouTube (owned by Google). CBS and the independent studio Lionsgate also announced similar content streaming deals with YouTube, which is essentially acknowledging its past mistakes with its stance on copyrights, and is willing to explore how it can together make money with content owners.

But I believe the landmark moment on this issue came in November when Google made a $125M copyright settlement with book publishers and authors, in arguably the biggest book deal ever in the U.S. history.

Under the deal, settled after two years of negotiations, Google will pay $125M to settle claims from authors and publishers for its earlier digital scanning of their copyrighted works without their permission. Google will be able to allow users to buy online access to copyrighted, out-of-print works, and will provide free online views of them at public libraries. Book titles that are still in print will be available only if publishers and authors agree to include them in the Google Book Search program, that is aimed at copying and indexing books, including copyrighted works, and allowing users to search through them online.

The settlement will provide a potentially lucrative e-commerce revenue stream to Google, that derived 99% of its total 2008 revenue ($21.8Bn) from advertising. A framework has been laid out for a new system that will track total revenue generated by Google from books (book sales, advertising and other fees) and split it between Google (37%) and authors & publishers (63%).

Google' s corporate mission is to "organize the world's information and make it universally accessible and useful." And make money through contextual advertising alongside that information. Google's Book Search program is another initiative by the company towards this mission.

This settlement signifies a major shift for Google, which has basically conceded that information is not free. A precedent has been set for content owners to make a case that they are entitled to a large piece of the advertising revenue generated by their content used by Google and other Internet search engines. Search revenue, at 41%, was the largest component of the total U.S. online advertising revenue of $21Bn in 2007.

Legal experts would read between the lines of the Google settlement to re-interpret the “fair use” doctrine of copyright law. Google, on the other hand, still maintains that the "fair use" clause allows it to continue its practice of indexing all Web content by its search engine and generating revenue without sharing it with content owners. “It is not a concession of our legal position,” said David Drummond, Google’s chief legal officer.

As the digital media industry matures, we'll see more interpretations and redefinitions of legal concepts such as fair use, many of which were defined in the age before Internet, as a medium to consume content, changed everything. There will also be revisions of business practices regarding who gets paid what and by whom.

I hope one of the most important lessons from the Google settlement is a reminder to owners of intellectual property that they can choose to lock it away, give it away, or, most sensibly, share it in exchange for reasonable compensation.

For now, I won't be surprised to see Viacom lawyers back in the news on the company's $1Bn lawsuit against Google.

September 29, 2008

Tracking Chrome's adoption

Google launched its Web browser Chrome, one of its most important products ever, on September 2, 2008. As users study and test Chrome's features, I'm going to regularly start tracking its user adoption over two-week periods using the browser traffic source to my blog.

For the first data point, I'm picking the two-week period starting one week after the Chrome was launched. Chrome has already gained a 3.4% browser market share amongst my blog's readers. Since most of them obviously belong to the digital media/consumer Internet industry, they're expected to be early adopters. Still, I think these results are impressive. We'll see if Chrome's numbers are sustainable.

Percentage, by browsers, of the total visits to this blog
Period: Sept 9, 2008 - Sept 22, 2008

  1. Firefox 61.0%
  2. Internet Explorer 30.5%
  3. Chrome 3.4%
  4. Safari 1.7%
  5. Others 3.4%
To keep things in perspective, here is the global market share for browsers:

Source: Net Applications, August 2008

September 3, 2008

Google Chrome may re-ignite the Web browser war

Google yesterday launched its Web browser called Chrome. Compared to dozens of products that Google now offers in its mission "to organize the world's information and make it universally accessible and useful," Chrome may be one of the company's most significant launches since Google Search, the company's debut product which generated 99% of its total revenue of $16.6Bn last year.

If Internet is the revolutionary land of new opportunity, browser is the "car" everyone needs to explore the "land" and enjoy the journey. The Web browser therefore is the ultimate Trojan horse a company can use to influence users' online experience and introduce new products & services. Chrome will enable Google to tie together its major products into a seamless user-friendly experience (e.g., Search, Gmail, maps, docs, analytics, etc). Some of its products will work more efficiently with Chrome. For example, Google Analytics has relied on server-side information to provide analytics data to clients. Chrome will allow Google to gather and provide much stronger analytics data by grabbing browsing information from the client side.

Additionally, by developing its own browser, Google can speed up releases of its own Web software, which have always hinged on working with Internet Explorer and were therefore dependent on Microsoft's development cycles. Now, Google can release new applications that initially run just with Chrome, providing it an alternative product launch platform, and simultaneously driving Chrome's adoption through popular Google applications.

On aggregate, Chrome should increase adoption of other Google products and significantly boost its revenue potential beyond Search. The ultimate mission for Google is to optimize revenue streams by having all of users' data all the time - search data, publisher ad-serving data (thru DoubleClick) and now browser data.

Why now? While above reasons sound quite compelling, some may wonder why did not Google develop a browser sooner. There are new browsers on the market and in development (Microsoft's Internet Explorer 8) which give consumers the option to surf the Web in anonymity. Anonymous browsing, which allows users to have an online experience without leaving any trace/digital footprints, is probably the single biggest threat to Google's monetization model. Its revenue generation is based on its ability to collect information from its users as they search, and serve them targeted ads and search results.

Microsoft IE 8, expected to launch in Q1 09, has developed "InPrivate Browsing," a feature that allows users to surf in private. There has been a long-expected threat that Microsoft (IE) or Apple (Safari) could mess with the Web cookies that are critical to the functioning of online advertising networks/exchanges, such as DoubleClick (now owned by Google). Competitive threat, including recent U.S. government efforts to make a stink about Google's privacy policies, probably pushed Google to make a proactive effort in launching Chrome and including its own "incognito mode" in the browser.

Chrome in all likelihood will be the default browser on Google's soon-to-be-released Android mobile operating system. The launch timing therefore makes perfect sense.

Google apparently had been working on the browser for two years, and the launch over the long weekend was leaked through its comic explaining the product rationale.

Chrome, an open-source Web browser, faces a tough market with three players currently controlling 98%+ of the browser market. Microsoft's Internet Explorer (IE) has a dominating 72%+ share, which has however decreased from over 90% share during the past three-four years due to the success of Mozilla's open-source Firefox browser.


Source: Net Applications, August 2008

I know a bit about the Web browser space. I led the marketing and distribution of AOL's Web browser (one of my several roles at that "constantly transforming" firm).

Yes, AOL did launch a Web browser in late 2004. The goal was to promote AOL.com when AOL opened its content walled garden for free consumption through an open portal. The secondary goal for AOL Browser was to generate search revenue through AOL Search. Microsoft's IE at the time commanded a powerful 90%+ global market share (post Netscape's demise), but had not introduced a major new version after IE 6 for over three years - a lifetime in the Web world. That's what monopoly does. The AOL Browser was built on the IE 6 rendering engine, given IE's ubiquity, and a royalty free license that AOL won from Microsoft. AOL introduced several industry leading features in its browser - a separate search box, tabbed browsing, back/forward preview button, arguably the fastest speed for browser launch and page rendering, separate pull-out side panel for bookmark management & previews, etc. Initially Microsoft openly encouraged AOL to innovate, and later on copied most of the AOL Browser features when it rolled out IE 7 almost a year and half later - a typical Microsoft response.

Power of default: The best way to distribute a new, free, utility software is to make it the default application on the hardware users buy to use that software. Web browser is a classic example of such a software. The majority of users don't actively pick their Web browser - it's an utility application to surf the Internet, and as long as the default browser on their PC does an OK job, users do not actively download and try a new browser. And the default browser on almost 100% of PCs is Microsoft's IE. Even though the U.S. Justice Department has clearly mandated that Microsoft cannot use its monopoly power in one area, say, the Windows Operating System, to bundle new Microsoft products in a manner that limits competition, PC OEMs, who have 100% freedom to choose the software they bundle with new PCs, hesitate to take on Microsoft head-on unless the stakes are very high. Almost all PC OEMs therefore make the Microsoft IE the default browser, not least because its monopoly power is self sustaining - since IE is the dominant browsing platform, all Web sites and third party applications are designed to work on IE, which is not true even for Firefox, the #2 browser. Even if OEMs bundle a new browser, it is added as the second browser to IE, and IE is the default browser, the definition of which is the browser launched by default if the user, say, clicks on a Web link in a Word document. Some PC OEMs let users choose their default browser (if more than one are bundled) during the set-up process of their new PC when it's taken out of the box.

Since browser is a free product (ever since Microsoft started distributing IE for free in order to kill Netscape, the first Web browser), its distribution economics are governed by Web search generated through the browser. We had built a separate search box in the AOL Browser chrome. Revenue share with OEMs for distribution was therefore based on search revenue through the browser. Having a persistent and separate search box right at your finger tips on the browser chrome was a big convenience for users (no need to open another window and go to, say, google.com), and the default search engine in that box ended up being a big winner (again, the power of default). Even though users could change the default search to the search engine of their choice, most never did. Google therefore made a huge fuss when Microsoft made its MSN Search as the default search engine in IE 7 when it was launched in 2006.

It'll therefore be interesting to see how Microsoft responds to Google making its search as the default search on Chrome, which has also merged the browser address and search box into one. We should not expect any complaints from Microsoft until Chrome gets some traction.

While Chrome may seem a threat to Microsoft given IE's 72% market share, I believe Chrome's adoption, at least initially, will come at Firefox's expense. As discussed above, only tech savvy users will experiment with Chrome in the beginning - the kind of users who switched to Firefox from IE at the first place.


On my first use, Chrome provides a very clean experience and appears fast. While Google may offer better features rolled out with faster frequency, better technology does not necessarily guarantee a win in the browser war (remember, Netscape). The power of default as discussed above and the entrenched distribution of IE present a tough hurdle.

While Google has not discussed Chrome in relation to social networking, where Google has been a laggard in the U.S., making a user's "social graph" (network of contacts) as part of the browser, and allowing 3rd party plug-ins and applications can be an easy product extension. Users potentially can access their social graph from a variety of Web services such as Facebook, MySpace, Flickr, Twitter, etc., all hooked into the browser itself. Chrome can shift the battle for the default Web platform from social networks to Web browsers.

Theoretically, a browser is a better platform compared to social networking sites like Facebook to aggregate various Web services. But it still faces all the basic challenges discussed earlier, that have to be overcome in order for browser to become the default platform on the Internet. However, Chrome's attempt to become users' and developers' common platform on which Web applications & services can be aggregated and built on may be another of those futile efforts from companies that have tried their proprietary products to become the common standard on the Internet. As argued earlier, the Web itself is the ultimate Internet platform, that is open and free for anyone and everyone without any potential conflict of interests. Having said that, Chrome may have a better shot than any other product thus far to become the Web operating system.

August 23, 2008

Google and Verizon search partnership - a win-win for all

According to The Wall Street Journal, Google and Verizon are partnering on a comprehensive search deal that will make Google the default search engine for all mobile subscribers of Verizon, the #2 carrier in the U.S. by subscribers (68M subs). This is a win-win deal for all stakeholders - Google, Verizon and its subscribers - and has the potential of supercharging mobile search in the U.S. It should also be a big boost for data revenue, which would be the main revenue driver for wireless carriers, as discussed earlier.

Google created a whole new industry by developing an innovative advertising-based business model around Web search. The Verizon deal may allow Google to do the same with mobile search, which thus far has been sadly lagging its true potential. According to comScore M:Metrics, 93% of mobile subscribers do not use search on their phones today. Carriers have been trying their organic efforts and/or partnerships with smaller technology startups in order to have a lockdown on the economics and the user. The fear of the Web search giants taking a big piece of the lucrative mobile search revenue prevailed. Carriers' own efforts have failed because they haven't got either the product or the user experience right. Using search on a cell phone today requires booting up a mobile Web browser, finding your way to the search site/function, and then entering a search. The Verizon/Google deal envisions placement of a Google search bar on the screens of all Verizon handsets - a smart move. Users will be the winner from the convenience of an integrated search engine and with both the parties focusing on their individual strengths - Verizon striving to provide subscribers the best wireless network/coverage and customer service, and Google providing the best search experience and monetization potential through its vast network of advertisers, especially local advertisers which are more relevant for mobile search.

Mobile advertising in the U.S. is expected to explode by 28x over the next four years - from $244M in 2008 (per eMarketer) to $7 billion in 2012. As Web search has played a big role in online advertising, mobile search, an untapped potential today, is expected to be a major component of mobile advertising revenue.

No wonder Web search companies have been locking in carriers with exclusive deals during early days of mobile search when users are likely to use the default search engine on their phones. Google has a similar partnership with Sprint, and Yahoo has locked in AT&T. Google is also the default search engine on Apple's iPhone. Yahoo! is working with OEMs too, signing up Nokia to put the Yahoo! oneSearch shortcut on the home screen of Nokia series 60 phones. As user behavior evolves and phones open up over time, users are expected to pick up their search engine of choice as they do today on their PCs.

Google, the dominant Web search engine on the PCs, has also managed to take an early lead in mobile Web search. According to comScore M:Metrics, around 16.7M people in the U.S. use mobile search today. Of these, 63% use Google, 34% use Yahoo, and only 25% use carriers' search product. This does not add to 100% because some users are using multiple products. Google's early lead, without help from carriers, indicates that most users (me included) are simply typing google.com into their mobile Web browser to get to the search engine. The above carrier partnerships should help Google to further extend its lead.

The Google/Verizon partnership seems more extensive compared to other similar deals. Google would be able to distribute other products through its search bar on the phone screens (Google Maps, Gmail, etc), as well as extend its search product on Verizon's Web portal and its FiOS TV service.

February 2, 2008

Yahoo + Microsoft = Necessary but not sufficient to beat Google

People with maths background can relate to the "necessary but not sufficient condition" premise used for proving theorems and framing hypotheses. Microsoft's unsolicited $44.6Bn bid yesterday for Yahoo is a perfect case for this premise. The combination is necessary but not sufficient to unseat Google from its undisputed dominance in the online search advertising market. It definitely won't slow down Google's foray into other areas (beyond search) like cloud computing that threatens Microsoft's core desktop computing business where many have tried but failed to challenge Microsoft's monopoly .

The combination is "necessary" because Yahoo (#2, at 19% share of the search advertising market) and Microsoft (#3, 14%), together, stand the best chance to challenge Google's (#1, 56%) massive, and growing, lead in the U.S. online search advertising market. Search represents 99% of Google's total revenue of $16.6Bn in 2007. Yahoo's much hyped new search initiative (Panama) has thus far failed to halt its declining market share. It has practically lost the search battle to Google. Some have even suggested that Yahoo should outsource search across its network to Google, similar to what AOL has been doing. Microsoft, on the other hand, had not until recently realized the importance of Internet in information sharing and computing. It's a late comer in the search advertising business. This short-sightedness in an emerging space is common when your traditional business enjoys monopoly status and drives bulk of the total revenue.

Search has always been a scale business. Scale provides improved monetization as more advertisers in the network positively impact coverage, click-through rates, and pricing. Microsoft's lock on crucial access points through its Windows, Internet Explorer, Office, and Xbox platforms and Yahoo's massive global user base across its network of online properties will provide them several channels to advantageously put their search engine in front of their users. Such an advantage is required to tackle the Google juggernaut.

In other words, to have a viable alternative to Google in search advertising, a combination of Yahoo and Microsoft is "necessary."

Now, whether the Yahoo + Microsoft combination is "sufficient" to beat Google is a different question altogether. Firstly, we're talking about merging operations of two huge companies with significant overlaps in almost all global markets where they compete against each other. Consummating the merger and realizing the expected $1Bn is annual savings will be a big distraction in the short to mid-term - the duration during which Google can continually focus on improving its core search technology and widening its market lead.

I believe the biggest advantage Google has got over either Yahoo or Microsoft is its employees and its ability to continually attract and retain better talent. Google, at heart, is an engineering firm first. Product and technology folks at the company enjoy more power than folks on the business side. Yahoo has never been treated as a technology firm - it's an online media firm, competing in an emerging space where technology is the differentiator. It's still "cool" to work at Google (the coolness factor however is dwindling as Google looses its "startup charm" and grows in size - its employee base stood at 16,600 at the end of 2007, adding 6,000 during the year). Yahoo, on the other hand, is laying off employees and is suffering from a morale issue. Confidence at Microsoft 's Internet divisions has never been very encouraging, if we talk about the desire to be #1. Internet business for Microsoft's management, until recently, had been an afterthought. It is now trying to buy its way into the search advertising market through a series of recent acquisitions, leading up to the announcement of its bid for Yahoo, the biggest of them all.

Lastly, Google will still have almost double the market share in the search advertising market compared to the combined share of Yahoo and Microsoft. That's a big lead to overcome. Google has earned user's mind share, and it's unlikely many will suddenly switch their search behavior going forward unless the alternative is significantly better.

In short, a merger between Yahoo and Microsoft will not guarantee Google's displacement from the top, hence it won't be "sufficient."

Finally, a comment on the chances of the merger going through. I think initially we may see some game-playing by Yahoo to get the bid up, but ultimately Yahoo would accept the offer. It realizes that it needs serious help in overcoming the challenges it's facing, reflected by its languishing stock price and recent top management upheavals. I also doubt the U.S. Justice Department would block the deal, though the scrutiny may be closer in some of the global markets.

For the time being, let's sit back and enjoy the public drama that would be played in coming weeks as Yahoo responds to the Microsoft offer and other potential bidders emerge for one of the largest technology mergers ever.

November 2, 2007

Open social networks - Google's OpenSocial API

This happened faster than I expected - a common set of APIs to build social applications across multiple websites (social networks). The goal is to tear down the walls which keep hubs of users & their activities locked within each social network.

Facebook's astronomical growth with its closed, proprietary platform played a key role in expediting a wide cooperation, led by Google, amongst players on the other side of the line. These players, in addition to doing the right thing, also want to quickly stunt the user growth on the Facebook island - as users deepen their time/effort investment on Facebook, their switching "cost" out of its platform increases. Facebook traffic has almost doubled in the past five months since it opened its platform on May 24th (from 27M monthly uniques to 51M).

Google has created a partner ecosystem to release OpenSocial APIs which can be used by developers to create applications that will work on any of the host social networking sites in the ecosystem. There are already 27 partners in the ecosystem (MySpace, Bebo, Hi5, Ning, LinkedIn, Plaxo, Salesforce.com, etc.). Marc Andreessen, Founder of Ning, has a good explanation of benefits to participating partners on his blog. APIs are built on Google's Gadget technology.

Google has historically gone solo in creating new standards. What changed this time around?
  • Orkut, Google's social networking product, never really took off like MySpace or Facebook. It's therefore a defensive move by Google in order to not allow one of these sites to become the default destination for users' social activity on the Web. By lining up partners that have a strong desire to participate in open standards that give them access to more applications and by providing users an easier way to mange their information across social networks, Google has created a very compelling value proposition that benefits everyone - participating social networks, the end user, applications developers, and, above all, Google.
  • The promised holy grail with social networking is to leverage rich user data for high-CPM, targeted advertising. Google has a proven leadership in this game. But it needs access to that data. Even though questions still remain about ownership of user data on applications built using OpenSocial APIs and distributed on several social networks, common standards is a step in the right direction. It's a matter of time before data ownership, profit sharing, and related questions get answered.
  • OpenSocial will streamline the ability to feed Google ads into applications/widgets. Googles, thru its AdSense program, has the biggest network of advertisers on the planet. No other company is therefore better positioned to leverage the vast amount of advertising inventory that is being created by an explosion in the number of widgets/gadgets/applications on the Web. It also gives developers and marketers of applications, especially small- and mid-size firms, one channel to reach multiple audiences.


With Facebook's expected launch of its own advertising network that promises to effectively leverage user data for targeted advertising (e.g., thru News Feeds), it'll be interesting to see a showdown with OpenSocial, as advertising dollars continue to shift online, and brand advertisers play a bigger role in this shift.

Meanwhile, OpenSocial participants will be busy stabilizing the new standard and fixing its bugs. The first OpenSocial application was hacked within 45 minutes after its launch.

October 25, 2007

How can a Platform succeed in the long-run?

The rage in Silicon Valley today is all about platforms - platforms which are vying to become industry standards in their respective categories. Apple is pushing iPhone (cell phone applications) and iPod/iTunes (discovery, purchase and consumption of music and video). Google, Yahoo, Microsoft and AOL want their products (online advertising, maps, widgets/gadgets, etc) to become platforms in their respective categories. Facebook is hoping its social networking site to essentially become a communications platform on the Internet.

Here are three key criterion any company has to meet in order to make its product (platform) an industry standard:
  1. Solve a problem for users and players in your industry.
  2. Allow 3rd parties to easily build on top of your platform in order to continue innovation and expansion of the value the platform creates.
  3. Fairly share the created economic value with 3rd parties which are developing products on top of the platform and thus enhancing platform's value to its users - the most difficult of the three criterion to execute successfully.
The above rules apply for any industry, though you'll find more examples in the technology industry, where speed and scope of continuous innovations often rely on establishing common standards.

General Motor's failed experiment with its OnStar system to make it a standard platform in the automobile industry for a wireless system that can provide new communication capabilities to vehicles is an example where customers and industry players agreed with the value (criterion #1) but GM's competitors could not trust it on the third criterion.

Facebook has checked the boxes on all the three above criterion. Its ability to succeed on (3) is however still questionable because it's too early to judge how Facebook will balance the very fine line and the difficult task of profiting from its own innovations on its platform while letting 3rd parties have unfettered and equal footing access to the Facebook platform in the long run - the economic incentives for the two to happen simultaneously can clash very easily. Then, Facebook is operating in a space where it is competing with the ultimate industry platform, the Internet itself. No points for guessing the winner in that fight.

Similarly, Apple has failed thus far in playing win-win with content firms whose content it needs to sustain early success of its iPod/iTunes platform in the long run (3rd criterion).

MIT's Michael Cusumano, along with Annabelle Gawer, wrote The Elements of Platform Leadership in 2002, a book that I'd recommend folks to pick up given its relevance in the industry's current love affair with Facebook & Apple. The book provides lessons from Intel, Microsoft and Cisco - pioneers in their respective industries, which succeeded in establishing their platforms as industry standards.